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Turkey’s first tüp bebek (literally ‘tube baby’), Ece Çokar,
was born on 18 April 1989, 11 years after the birth of Louise
Brown heralded the dawn of a new era in assisted
reproduction. Following the creation of a pre-emptive legal
structure by the Ministry of Health – and the Germany-based
training of Turkish doctors entrusted with importing the6.04.005
r Ltd. This is an open access artic
/by-nc-nd/4.0/).latest medical technologies back to Turkey – her parents
were one of 10 couples recruited to undergo IVF treatment
at Izmir’s Ege University Hospital. Despite early successes,
however, the development of IVF in Turkey was slow and
tentative. In the late 1990s, a review of assisted reproduc-
tion practice across Europe (Schenker, 1997) showed Turkey
to be one of the countries with fewest fertility clinics per
capita, ahead only of Poland, Russia and Ukraine. Yet, ale under the CC BY-NC-ND license
40 ZB Gürtindecade later, the situation had completely changed. By 2008,
the national press was celebrating Turkey as ‘the world’s
seventh biggest IVF market’ (behind Israel, France, Spain,
England, the USA and Germany), and reflexively referring to
the country as a ‘tüp bebek paradise’. Indeed, today, having
gripped medical ambitions and the public imagination, tüp
bebek is a large and lucrative industry dedicated to the art of
making babies (Gürtin, 2013). As one of the most rapidly
growing IVF markets in the developing world (Urman and
Yakin, 2010), assisted reproduction in Turkey has not only
changed the lives of countless involuntarily childless couples,
but also impacted local notions about reproduction, infertility
and modernity (Aciksoz, 2015; Demircioğlu Göknar, 2015;
Gürtin, 2014).
Based on sociological research in Turkey between 2006
and 2010, including analysis of regulatory and media
materials, in-depth clinical ethnography, and interviews
with IVF patients and practitioners, this article constructs an
explanatory history of the introduction, growth and social
regulation of IVF in Turkey. Examining both the legal
framework and the rhetorical debates surrounding IVF, I
highlight how the nationally pertinent tensions between
Islam and secularism unfold in this particular context. I also
explore the role of the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government, with its neo-conservative and pronatalist
agenda, and the growing influence of the Ministry of
Religious Affairs to explain both the boom of the Turkish
IVF industry on the one hand, and the construction of firm
access restrictions on the other. I label the particular
‘repro-national’ character that emerges in this hybrid
state, with its precarious relations between secular princi-
ples and Sunni morality, a form of ‘patriarchal pronatalism’
promoting and funding IVF but only within strict ‘conjugal
confines’, justified with reference not only to religious but
also to moral, social and scientific rhetoric.The growth of IVF
After almost 15 years of slow growth, Turkey’s ‘tüp bebek
sector’ experienced a marked and accelerated development
in a very short period. The introduction of state and social
security funding for IVF treatment in February 2005 not only
widened access but also provided an unparallelled opportu-
nity for the expansion of the assisted reproduction industry.
Clinic numbers rose dramatically from 66 (20 state, 46
private) in 2005 to 91 (19 state, 72 private) in 2007, with
private clinics opening in nine additional cities, extending
coverage to 22 of Turkey’s 81 cities (Ministry of Health
figures, http://www.saglik.gov.tr). Even more markedly,
the number of annual treatment cycles doubled from
approximately 20,000 to 40,000 (Turkish Society of Repro-
ductive Medicine, https://www.tsrm.org.tr), amassing a
total turnover in excess of 300 million euros. Moreover, in
2008, Professor Bülent Tıraş, then president of the Turkish
Society for Obstetrics and Gynecology (TSOG), estimated
that, in order to properly meet demand, the sector would
need to perform 150,000 IVF cycles per year (Aktüel,
07.04.2008), while some newspaper reports claimed as
many as ‘2 million women waiting for tüp bebek’ (Radikal,
13.08.2007) across the nation. Although in more recent
years, clinic numbers have continued to rise, reaching 120centres in 2014 (located variously in private clinics, private
hospitals and state institutions), growth has become much
slower as various legislations have made it more difficult for
doctors to open their own private practices. Hence, my
fieldwork, conducted between April 2006 and December
2009, coincided perfectly with the extraordinary ‘boom’
period of the Turkish IVF industry enabling me to witness
both the opportunities (particularly in terms of access) and
challenges engendered by such rapid growth of the industry.
Today, there are approximately 120 IVF clinics operating
in Turkey. Although many are concentrated in the large
urban centres of Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, clinics have also
opened in the farthest corners of the country. The locally
welcomed establishment and successful operation of IVF
clinics in what are often considered traditional and conser-
vative areas of the country are a testament to the
widespread acceptability and desirability of high-tech
fertility treatments as IVF becomes ‘normalized’
(Thompson, 2005) in Turkey as it has been elsewhere
(Demircioğlu Göknar, 2015). Moreover, the spread of
assisted reproductive technologies is often interpreted by
practitioners and the popular media as an indication of
progressing social mores and national scientific advance-
ment, with newspaper reports representing infertility as ‘a
battle that must be fought until the end’ (Görgülü, 2007),
with IVF designated as the modern weapon of choice.Islam and secularism
In 1923, Turkey became the first secular democratic nation
with a predominantly Muslim population, a fact that has
arguably been more influential on the national character than
any other (for discussions see Bozdoğan and Kasaba, 1997;
Kandiyoti and Saktanber, 2002). It is still the case that the
most interesting and heated public debates in contemporary
Turkey concern and question the rhetorical and actual
mobilization of secularism and Islamism as the basis for binary
identities and identifications in both public and private
imaginaries. Such processes of dialogical identity formation,
in relation and reference to an ‘othered’ opposite, on the
part of both Islamists and secularists, have been recently
noted, described and analysed by anthropologists Ayşe
Saktanber (2002), Esra Özyürek (2006), Yael Navaro-Yashin
(2002) and Jenny White (2002), as part of their ethnographic
enquiries. Despite White’s pertinent description of a contin-
uum of identities, however, over the past decade, polarized
thinking and oppositional self-definitions have increased
among Turks who identify as ‘secular’ (laik) or ‘Muslim’
(Müslüman), amounting to what some have called a ‘conflict
between two Turkeys’ (Yavuz, 2009: 144).
The AKP, which entered its third term with a strong
majority in 2011, has been variously referred to in both
the national and international press as ‘fundamentalist’,
‘Islamist’ and a ‘party with Islamic roots’. Although they
define themselves as ‘conservative democratic’ and deny an
Islamic agenda, critics, such as political scientist Hakan Yavuz
(2006, 2009), accuse the party of a ‘politics of camouflage’,
claiming that, although ‘the AKP never uses the explicit
language of political Islam, and indeed often feels compelled
to stress that it is not an Islamic party’, its ‘repressed identity
occasionally re-emerges’ (2009: 3). Acar and Altunok add that
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explicitly religious, its ‘messages are often traceable to
Islamic stances of its leaders’ and are aimed at ‘the selective
stigmatization of practices that religion denounces’ (2013:
14–15). Indeed, regardless of one’s view of the AKP, the
current political atmosphere in Turkey is both indicative and
constitutive of important social and religious change. For
example, the AKP has transformed the Presidency of Religious
Affairs (Diyanet) into a central agency with an annual budget
of $1.6 billion – more than the combined budgets of Turkey’s
European Union, Foreign, Energy and Environment ministries.
And, according to an article by Daniel Steinvorth (2012) in der
Spiegel, there is now one mosque for every 350 people in
Turkey, in contrast to one hospital for every 60,000. The
conservatism of the government has also impacted gender
relations and the role of women in particular ways, reigniting
existing debates about women, modernity and Islam in
Turkish society (e.g. Acar, 1995; Arat, 1997; Kandiyoti,
1997; Tekeli, 1995). Indeed, there are many indications that
the social opportunities available to women have receded and
that women’s rights have been regressing over the past
decade, as the AKP has sought to advance a traditionalist and
neo-conservative family values agenda through gendered
governmental logics. Reviewing ‘the politics of the intimate’
in Turkey, Acar and Altunok (2013: 14) explain that the
interaction between the two political rationalities of
neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism have come to play
important roles in the shaping or regulation of private and
public domains in the last decade, and argue that, ‘given the
intermesh of [these] rationalities, the notion of gender
equality loses its significance, leaving disadvantaged groups
open to the detrimental effects of power relations’.‘No home will be left childless!’
As Steinvorth (2012) notes, ‘[t]here is no doubt that the
Turkish premier is a deeply conservative man. His view of
women is traditional and his notions about family policy are
patriarchal’. Particularly since 2007, patriarchal and moral
notions, often framed by religion, have become increasingly
dominant in AKP rhetoric (Acar and Altunok, 2013). The
party’s brand of neo-conservatism is, as Yavuz convincingly
demonstrates, a ‘social attitude rather than a political one
[...] filtered through tradition (read Islam)’, with ‘the first
critical element [...] its stress on the family as an institution
and on a particular set of values surrounding the family’
(2009: 94). The emphasis on this ‘first critical element’ is
loud and clear in a speech made by President Erdoğan on
8 December 2008:
If our family institution is strong, then we are strong as a nation.
If the institution of the family is eroding, then also as a nation we
are facing collapse. Because of this I insist upon the family! […]
For it will aid in solving many of our problems if the family
structure is strong. (Author’s translation; see the news agency
website http://www.netbarcilik.com for the full Turkish text of
this speech)
The AKP’s neo-conservative and pronatal family focus is
striking, not only because of its overt nature, but also
because it represents a distinct shift in the political positionon population policy and family planning, ‘[abandoning] the
state’s decades-long anti-natalist population policies in
favour of a pro-natalist approach to population’ (Aciksoz,
2015). This shift is also evidenced in the government’s
provision of financial incentives for early marriage and
childbearing, anti-abortion rhetoric, and negativity towards
Caesarian section delivery (on the questionable grounds that
it limits the number of healthy pregnancies a woman can
carry) (Acar and Altunok, 2013; Aciksoz, 2015; Shafak,
2012). Speaking during celebrations to mark International
Women’s Day on 8 March 2008 in Uşak (an Aegean city),
Erdoğan delivered what has subsequently been coined his
‘three children for everyone’ speech:
The West is now crying. Do not fall into the same traps! If it
continues like this, by 2030, most of Turkey’s population will be
over 60. My dear sisters, I am not speaking as a Prime Minister, I
am speaking as your troubled brother. Please do not fall into this
trap. We must protect our young population. […] If you do not
want your population to decline, then each family should have
three children. […] I speak from experience: a child is a blessing,
you should know this. I have four children, I am happy, I wish I had
more. Each came with their own blessings. (Author’s translation;
original Turkish and news item available at: https://ntvmsnbc.
com/news/438418asp)
This message was not only based on unfounded fears,
according to demographic projections from the Turkish
Statistical Institute, but it also immediately drew strong
reactions from national women’s groups, feminists and
female Members of Parliament from opposition parties as
inappropriate and backwardly patriarchal (as reported, for
example, in Vatan, 09.03.2008). The statement was seen as
indicative of the AKP’s views on women’s role in society, and
reflective of its attitudes on family life and reproduction,
clearly demonstrating the government’s strong pro-natalist
attitudes and its commitment to pursue a neo-conservative
family values agenda through intervention in reproductive
rights and policies. In light of this, it is perhaps not surprising
that the AKP has been a strong supporter of extending
access to assisted reproduction, as long as it is used ex-
clusively within strict heteronormative parameters, to aid
only the creation of traditional families in which a married
mother and father conceive and nurture their genetically
related offspring (Gürtin, 2011, 2012a, 2012b). It is these
parameters, not only reliant on the marital form and
contract, but also containing strong implications of exclu-
sivity, boundedness, and both moral and sexual piety, that I
label as the ‘conjugal confines’ which define the character
of Turkish IVF. Moreover, they are clearly part and parcel
of a broader agenda of patriarchal pronatalism, not only
with regard to how families are created and what kinds of
reproduction are sanctioned, but also with regard to women’s
role in society, which according to such priorities is funda-
mentally equated with mothering.
Indeed, it was the AKP government that introduced
funding for IVF through all three social security institutions
(the SSK, The Retirement Fund and Bağ-kur, covering
different types of workers) in its 2005 Budget Implementation
Directive (Official Gazette no. 25722, 09.02.2005; item 10.3
is titled ‘Tüp Bebek’, and provides details of the funding
protocol and outlines eligibility criteria), streamlining and
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Security Health Application Statute (Official Gazette no.
27012, 29.10.2008). These decisions proved extremely popu-
lar in Turkey and were celebrated by much of the media as
humanist and progressive government acts indicative of
medico-scientific modernity, with headlines such as ‘Tüp
bebek boost from social security! Everyone should be a
mum or dad – All hopes have sprouted as tüp bebek is
reclassified as a compulsory health expenditure’ (Günaydın,
17.04.2006). Moreover, the recategorization of IVF treatment
as ‘therapeutic’ and ‘compulsory’, rather than an ‘elective’
health intervention or expenditure, was not only of great
practical significance (in extending access), but also reflec-
tive of a shift in attitudes, transforming involuntary child-
lessness into a medical condition for which the seeking of
biomedical treatment is anticipated and supported. Indeed,
funding coverage was credited throughout the country, both
for enabling much wider sectors of the population to access
IVF, and for destigmatizing assisted reproduction and increas-
ing its popularity. Enthusiastic newspaper reports exclaimed
‘Rush to Tüp Bebek’ (Radikal, 22.05.2005), ‘Social Security
Bargains for Tüp Bebek’ (Sabah, 27.04.2006) and ‘New Era in
Tüp Bebek’ (Hürriyet, 08.02.2007), making hyperbolic and
utopian promises like ‘No home will be left childless
(Çocuksuz ev kalmayacak)!’ (Takvim, 17.08.2008), to feed
what one of my ‘expert’ interviewees referred to (at the
time) as ‘an IVF frenzy’.
The budget directive specified eligibility for IVF treat-
ment funding to include involuntarily childless couples
who had been married for a minimum of 3 years, in which
the wife was between 23 and 39 years old. Couples
fulfilling these requirements could receive three cycles of
intrauterine insemination (IUI) (where deemed medically
appropriate) and two partially-funded cycles of IVF treat-
ment (with patients contributing 30% to their first, and 25%
to their second, treatment cycle). The state-defined cost of
an IVF cycle was 1240 YTL (excluding the cost of drugs), and
patients could choose either to receive treatment at a public
hospital or to use funding as partial payment for (more
expensive) treatment in a private clinic. As I began my
fieldwork in spring 2006, even private clinics had long waiting
lists of couples keen to use their funding ‘entitlements’.
However, because much of the bureaucratic details remained
unclear, many patients and clinics were caught up in
‘chaos’, unsure of when and how they would receive re-
imbursement. The ability for private clinics to act as ‘funded
IVF providers’, after contractual agreements with the Ministry
of Health, was encouraged as a means to ameliorate some of
the overcrowding in public hospitals, and considered a
preferential arrangement by many patients. By 2007, social
security-funded couples comprised at least 60% of all IVF
patients in Turkey, and waiting lists were growing (Radikal,
13.08.2007).Regulating reproduction
In Turkey, a regulatory framework for assisted reproduction
was introduced in 1987 by a designated body within the
Ministry of Health (Elcioğlu and Yildirim, 2004). Preceding the
birth of Turkey’s first IVF baby by 2 years, this pre-emptive
legislation, titled ‘By-law on Centres for Assisted Procreation’(Official Gazette no. 19551; translation by Elcioğlu and
Yildirim, 2004) determined how assisted reproduction could
be initiated and practised, and appointed the Ministry of
Health responsible for licensing, registering, regulating and
overseeing all forms of assisted reproductive practice. As
assisted reproductive technology developed, the legislation
was superseded by a more detailed ‘By-Law Concerning
Treatment Centres for Assisted Procreation’ on 19 November
1996 (Official Gazette no. 22822; translation ibid.). This more
comprehensive statute, detailing definitions, prohibitions
and all necessary requirements (including building and
physical environment specifications, equipment, materials
and personnel) for assisted reproductive practice (Arda,
2007), was subsequently updated four times – twice in
January 1998 (Official Gazette no. 23227 and Official Gazette
no. 23244), once in March 2001 (Official Gazette no. 24359)
and once in July 2005 (Official Gazette no. 25869) – in order
to reflect advances and technological developments, but
retained essentially the same character. The 2005 version of
the statute was operational when I conducted my fieldwork in
Turkey, from 2006 to 2009, and it is this version that is cited
below. Subsequently, in March 2010, the AKP government
introduced a new version of the regulations, the ‘Legislation
Concerning Assisted Reproduction Treatment Practices and
Centres’ (Official Gazette no. 27613; author’s translation).
This latest version instigates novel restrictions to the way
assisted reproductive technology is practised in Turkey,
including the introduction of mandatory single-embryo
transfer for all women under the age of 35 in their first or
second cycle of IVF treatment (Kutlu et al., 2011; Urman and
Yakin, 2010) and, more significantly for the current discus-
sion, emphasis on the prohibition of any third-party involve-
ment in reproduction (Gürtin, 2010, 2011). I explore this
further below.
At its outset, Turkey’s assisted reproduction legislation
(in the 2005 version) provided the following definition for
‘Assisted Reproduction Treatments’:
Procedures, accepted as treatment methods by modern medi-
cine, which involve assisting the fertilization of the prospective
mother’s egg with her husband’s sperm in various ways, enabling
them to fertilize outside of the body when necessary, and
transferring the gametes or the embryo back to the prospective
mother’s genital organs. (Official Gazette no. 25869, item 4f;
author’s translation and emphasis)
Such a definition is extremely important, not just
semantically or symbolically, but for its actual regulatory
implication. By referring to the ‘prospective mother’ and her
‘husband’ (rather than a socially or relationally indeterminate
‘man’ and ‘woman’), the legislation places the marital unit as
legally central and clinically indispensable for assisted
reproductive practice. Moreover, by providing this as a
definition of assisted reproduction (rather than more explic-
itly as a definition of their legal application), it collapses the
distinction between what is scientifically possible and what is
socially acceptable (Gürtin, 2011, 2012a). Of course, such an
interpretation of assisted reproduction is not unique to
Turkey; reproductive technologies lend themselves well to
the perpetuation of a traditional patriarchal agenda, where
women must become biological mothers to their husband’s
children, as pointed out by many feminist critiques (for a
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extraordinary here is the level of selective erasure evident in
the Turkish legislation; by contextualizing assisted reproduc-
tion as squarely equivalent with the heteronormative repro-
ductive unit, and setting legal marriage as an access
requirement, the statute limits the use of assisted reproduc-
tive technology within conjugal confines. Thus while, global-
ly, assisted reproduction has been associated with the
‘creation of family types that would not otherwise have
existed’ (Fasouliotis and Schenker, 1999: 26; my emphasis),
including gay and lesbian families, single mothers by choice
and myriad family types formed with third-party assistance,
within Turkey, assisted reproduction has been used exclu-
sively to aid the propagation of traditional families (Gürtin,
2011) framed by a patriarchal pronatalist agenda.
These conjugal confines for assisted reproductive prac-
tice, limiting treatment provision to married couples using
their own gametes, are also reiterated at the start of Section
Five (‘Prohibitions’):
The use of the eggs and sperm or the embryo of applicants
undergoing ART [(assisted reproductive technology)] for any
other purpose, or in the treatment of other applicants, or the
use of those [sperm, eggs or embryos] obtained from anyone
other than the applicants in the treatment of the applicants, or
the storage, use, transfer, and sale [of sperm, eggs or embryos]
for any sort of purpose falling outside the definitions of this
legislation, are prohibited. (Ibid.: item 17; author’s translation)
Until the 2010 amendments, the above was the only
regulatory reference to the prohibition of third-party
assisted reproduction. Apart from this statement, there
were no other items in this or any other Turkish legislation
that specifically addressed the use of donor gametes or
surrogacy. There were, however, plentiful media reports
circulating by 2009 claiming that involuntarily childless
Turkish couples who could not find a solution to their
infertility through IVF were willing to use donor gametes and
engage in ‘reproductive tourism’ to nearby Cyprus or Greece
for this purpose (Gürtin, 2011; Urman and Yakin, 2010).
As I conducted interviews with IVF practitioners in 2008
and 2009, there was a growing awareness of the covert
cross-border choreographies facilitated by Turkish clinics
and their Cypriot ‘branches’ (Gürtin, 2011). Although some
practitioners complained about or criticized this state of
affairs, they were mostly disapproving of the financial
aspects of this practice, particularly ‘fee splitting’ between
clinics. In general, the facilitation of cross-border reproduc-
tive care (CBRC) for patients willing or wishing to access
third-party assisted reproduction was considered a ‘solution’
rather than a ‘problem’, as expressed in this quote from a
senior practitioner:
It is not yet time to discuss the legalisation of donor gametes
here in Turkey. Individuals may accept this of course, we live in a
secular (laik) country; but it would be very difficult for a
government to raise this openly, it would create a huge scandal.
So, as you must have noticed, it [treatment using donor gametes]
happens in alternative ways, and [the government] would rather
turn a blind eye to it. (Senior IVF practitioner; Expert Interview
no. 6)It thus came as a surprise when, with very little warning
and seemingly minimal consultation, the AKP government
introduced a set of amendments to the regulation of assisted
reproduction in March 2010 (Gürtin, 2010, 2011). In this latest
version, following item 18.4, which outlines prohibitions on all
third-party reproductive assistance (as per item 17 from the
2005 version, discussed above), there is a new item setting out
the legal ramifications that will result if third-party assisted
reproduction is practised by a Turkish clinic:
In the event of a discovery at any stage of a pregnancy achieved
against any of these prohibitions [on third-party reproductive
assistance], the [ART practice] certificates of the involved
persons will be nullified, the centre will be closed indefinitely,
and all personnel will be indefinitely barred from working at ART
centres. (Official Gazette no. 27513, item 18.5; author’s
translation)
Furthermore, items 18.6 and 18.7 stipulate the conse-
quences for CBRC involving third-party assisted reproduc-
tion, including financial penalties, centre closures and the
reporting of involved persons to the state prosecutor (see
Gürtin, 2011 for details). These additions take the nationally
enforced conjugal confines of assisted reproductive practice
and extend them with extraterritorial relevance. Notably,
this represents the first instance of a country legislating
against the reproductive travel of its citizens in order to
access donor gametes (Gürtin, 2010, 2011). Unsurprisingly,
with this move the government came under heavy criticism,
particularly from Turkish feminists and women’s rights
campaigners, not only for infringing reproductive rights and
discriminating against single women and gay couples (Acar
and Altunok, 2013), but also for failing to publicly debate
the ban before its swift introduction; Pinar Ilkkaracan, a
prominent women’s rights campaigner, chided, ‘[t]his
government has slipped this regulation without any debate
in parliament’ (Head, 2010; Zorlu, 2010). Irfan Şencan,
Director of the Ministry of Health’s Treatment Services
department, explained the new regulations as necessitated
by the growth of CBRC in recent years: ‘It is a way of
breaking Turkish law abroad’ (Hürriyet Daily News,
15.03.2010), he argued. Şencan further clarified to Hurriyet
Daily News that the prohibitions against CBRC will ‘protect
ancestry [and] make the newborn’s mother and father
known’ in alignment with the existing Article 231 of the
Turkish Penal Code, which makes it illegal to obscure or
conceal the lineage of a child. It is interesting that, although
the desire to protect children’s lineage (nesep) is articulated
with reference to an existing secular law, and indeed
reflects what has been a guiding principle in the legal
governance of the Turkish family even during the radical
secularist period, it also noticeably echoes the Islamic
imperative to conserve genealogy. Indeed, Şencan’s inter-
pretation of the penal code and his reasoning is assessed by
Ilkkaracan as a complete misinterpretation of the spirit of
the law: ‘This is completely against the philosophy of the
reformed penal code’, she argues, maintaining that its
proper intention is to protect the inheritance rights of
children, not to constrain family formation. Thus, while on
the one hand, the prohibition of CBRC can be seen (and is
explained by some members of the Ministry of Health) as a
logical extension of the existing prohibition on third-party
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including several IVF professionals I interviewed in the
aftermath of the legislation – provide an alternative explana-
tion of the prohibitions as emblematic of the strong traditional
family values espoused by the neo-conservative AKP, and
indicative of its agenda to ‘smuggle’ Islam into government.Conjugal confines
The conjugal confines I describe for assisted reproductive
practice in Turkey clearly echo the ‘Sunni Islamic approach’ to
assisted reproduction throughout much of the Muslim Middle
East (Gürtin et al., 2015; also see Inhorn 2003, 2004). However,
whereas the parameters of assisted reproductive practice
across the Muslim Middle East are justified with direct
reference to religion – namely the rulings of Islam (Inhorn
and Tremayne, 2012) – in Turkey, the same parameters are
characterized as ‘secular’ and justified as ‘bioethical’ and
‘moral’, rather than religious (e.g. Arda, 2007). Several Turkish
commentators have advanced (at international conferences,
for example) the view that Turkey, where ‘98% of the
population is Muslim, represents an ideal model country in
which the legal framework [of assisted reproduction] is being
shaped according to the secular governmental protocols,
established socio-cultural values, as well as contemporary
medical advances’ (Kahraman, 2007: 105), and entered heated
debates with ‘foreign’ scholars who view Turkey’s assisted
reproduction legislation as ‘religious’ or ‘Islamic’ (see debates
from the 2006 Ethics, Law and Moral Philosophy of Reproduc-
tive Biomedicine conference, as printed in Edwards, 2007a,
2007b). Indeed, the extent to which Islam exerts an influence
on Turkey’s assisted reproduction regulation is a controversial
topic without an easy answer, and I explore these competing –
and heavily charged – characterizations in detail elsewhere
(Gürtin, 2012a). While on the one hand Turkey is a secular
country, on the other, it has a predominantly (Sunni) Muslim
population whose views on such fundamental and ethical
matters are undoubtedly shaped by their religious affiliation
and the broader aspects of a Muslim culture. Indeed, the two
elements have been integral to defining how assisted repro-
duction is practised in Turkey.
Turkey’s highest religious authority, the Presidency of
Religious Affairs (Diyanet), is the official body charged with
providing information about religious rulings, prohibitions and
morality to the country’s religious leaders (imams), as well as
to the general public. Despite the overt secularism of Turkish
government and legislation and the rhetoric of secular assisted
reproduction regulations (see Gürtin, 2012a), Diyanet plays a
very active role in discussions about assisted reproduction. The
regular presence of statements from Diyanet in popular media
coverage of assisted reproductive technology, internet patient
forums and even the websites of some Turkish IVF clinics,
suggests that (at least some) Turkish men and women, and
some institutions, are concerned with abiding by Islamic
parameters and teachings.
Diyanet’s rulings on assisted reproduction (e.g. ‘Tüp
Bebek’, May 2002 and ‘Islamic assessment of today’s medical
developments in tüp bebek and stem-cell research’, March
2006, both available through www.divanet.gov.tr) replicate
the rulings of Sunni authorities from around the world,
asserting that assisted reproduction should receiveencouragement, as long as the procedures do not damage
the sanctity of the family or threaten the four central
concerns of protecting inheritance, preventing incest,
prohibiting adulterous relations and preserving lineage.
Thus, although Diyanet’s fetva clearly states that IVF ‘is no
longer permissible if a foreign element is included, meaning
if the sperm, eggs or womb belong to a person outside of the
husband-wife couple; because according to the general
principles of the religion of Islam, there is an imperative
for a legitimate child to belong, whether by sperm or egg or
womb, to a wedded husband-wife couple’ (Presidency of
Religious Affairs, 2006; author’s translation), within the
bounds of marriage the use of IVF is both supported and
encouraged. As articulated by Saim Yeprem, theologian and
member of Diyanet’s Higher Council, ‘since children (as
blessings) are Allah’s endowment, the treatment seeking of
involuntarily childless couples does not contradict a sense of
fate or destiny’. He adds:
Islam neither considers scientific research an intervention in
God’s job, nor does it encumber freedom of research. It rather
regards scientific research as discovering laws of nature to figure
out the works of God (which is called al-sunnatullah in Islamic
literature) in the universe. (2007: 47)
Indeed, as well as explicitly supporting the practice of
assisted reproductive techniques within conjugal confines,
Diyanet has even opened its own hospital with an IVF clinic in
Istanbul. Asked to comment on the IVF clinic at the opening
ceremony, Professor Ali Bardakoğlu, Diyanet’s president,
explained: ‘We will support all treatments within the
framework of our religion. […] The aims of religion and
medicine are the same: to make people happier on this
earth’ (Akşam, 29.12.2005). Sometime later, when twins
conceived after treatment at the clinic were born to a
42-year-old imam and his wife from Samsun, newspapers
reported the birth as ‘Diyanet’s first tüp bebekleri (tube
babies)’, and quoted the imam as saying, ‘[w]e were
comforted by Diyanet’s statements, and we came to this
hospital with a clear conscience’ (Sabah, 11.02.2007).
Indeed, more generally, practitioners credit Diyanet’s
support for IVF with not only alleviating concerns, but also
with actively and influentially promoting treatment-seeking
among couples ‘who in the past did not come for tüp bebek
for fear of religion’ (Star Gazete, 24.11.2007). Some IVF
clinics, such as the Maya Clinic in Ankara, for example, even
provide summaries and direct links to Diyanet’s fetva on
their websites’ information pages.
It would, however, be over-simplistic to stipulate a
homogenous position against third-party assisted reproduc-
tion among Turkish men and women informed solely by
Muslim morality and culture, because individuals do not
always care about, follow, or even have an accurate
knowledge of the teachings of their religion. Moreover,
although the AKP may represent and publicly proclaim a
morality derived from and reflecting Sunni Islamic principles,
Turks comprise a heterogeneous group, including Sunnis,
Alevis, minorities from other religions and the non-religious.
While it is generally true that third-party reproductive
assistance (particularly the use of donor spermatozoa) is a
stigmatized taboo in Turkey, the available research evidence
on public and patient opinions about third-party assisted
45Patriarchal pronatalismreproduction certainly suggests a diversity of opinions among
Turkish people (Baykal et al., 2008; Isikoglu et al., 2006;
Kilic et al., 2009) and warrants further exploration of the
multiplicity of attitudes regarding reproduction and sexuality.Concluding remarks
This article has sought to describe and explain the particu-
larities of IVF and assisted reproduction practice in Turkey, a
hybrid context where secular laws and a modernist approach
to medicine intersect with a Sunni Muslim culture and
neo-conservative government policies. Concentrating partic-
ularly on the years 2006 to 2010, during which I conducted
fieldwork, and which coincided not only with the boom period
of Turkish IVF, when clinic numbers, treatment cycles and the
public visibility of IVF rose dramatically, but also with the
introduction of certain regulatory and attitudinal changes, I
have provided a repro-national portrait of this specific
context. Situated within the broad Islam versus secularism
tensions that permeate this society on many levels, the field
of IVF too displays a complicated negotiation between what
are at times conflicting and competing ideological positions
regarding the country’s present and its future. In this
particular arena, we see the vying of medical modernity and
advancing technological capabilities of reproduction, as well
as globalization, international travel, and changing social
attitudes on the one hand, with religious institutions,
traditional mores and the regulatory and symbolic pronounce-
ments of a neo-conservative government on the other. The
pronatalism of the AKP government is evident not only in the
overt calls by Erdogan for ‘each family [to] have three
children’, but also in its broader involvement in reproductive
health and politics, of which the control of assisted
reproduction is just one quintessential example.
Indeed, with its introduction of funding for assisted
reproductive treatments, and its willingness to enable a
prominent rhetorical role for the Ministry of Religious Affairs,
the AKP has on the one hand enabled the rapid growth and
accessibility of IVF throughout Turkey, while on the other
curtailed its practice within strict conjugal confines. The fact
that the conjugal confines for assisted reproduction practice
have not only been asserted through regulatory, ideological
and financial means within the country, but have also been
extraterritorially extended (in law, if not in practice) is both
striking and indicative of the centrality of reproductive politics
for this government. As Acar and Altunok (2013: 20) remind us,
‘family is crucial to the functioning of the neo-conservative
mentality’ not just as the only legitimate domain for
experiencing sexual and reproductive capabilities, but also
because it plays ‘a crucial role in producing and sustaining the
desired moral order’. Heteronormative conjugality, as the
legal and social parameters delineating not just the use of
assisted reproductive technology but more broadly the
acceptable family unit then, is the cornerstone of the AKP’s
patriarchal pronatalism. It is, thus, the pronatalist rhetoric of
the neo-conservative government, tensions between Islamic
and secular principles, and a commitment to medico-scientific
modernity that comprise the repro-national character of
Turkey at the start of the 21st century. Future research may
productively examine how the contours of reproductive
citizenship are affected by the growing polarization of politicalidentities, privatization of healthcare under the neo-liberal
rule of the AKP, or Turkey’s developing links with the European
Union. Situating these findings within the growing sociological
and anthropological scholarship on the localization of IVF and
assisted reproduction, as is the case in this Symposium issue of
Reproductive BioMedicine and Society, demonstrates all the
more vividly the extent to which personal reproductive choices
and decisions are intimately entangled with the social and
national contexts of reproductive governance.Acknowledgements
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